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[ Abstract ]
This paper argues and shows how ethnic dimension is still 
very important in understanding political contestations in 
Malaysia. To do this, the paper reviews the political as well 
as population demography to back its assertion. And it is 
not necessarily improper to continue to use this ethnic lens, 
although the continued use of this approach has come 
under heavy criticism both within and from outside 
Malaysia. Raging debates in Malaysia and by Malaysians are 
still very much shaped by ethnicity and increasing regional 
differences. This is further compounded by other factors 
such as religion, language, and education. In fact, these 
tools have been more intensely used of late compared to 
any period before in history as they easily politicize and 
attract followers.
Keywords: Malaysia, ethnic relations, regionalism, national 
integration
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Ⅰ. Introduction
For more than fifty years, the ethnic lens has continued to be 
important in understanding and deciphering contestation in 
Malaysia’s politics and society. It has steadily intensified. As a 
matter of fact, this approach of explaining political antagonism 
propagated by insecure elements within Malaysian society is rising 
whether or not the latter concern is founded or otherwise. In the 
last 10 years, increasing ethnic tension have been flaring up and 
many sides do not appear too keen to a resolution; instead, parties 
ride on these divisions to further popularity within their respective 
communities.1) 
To explore further what is stated above, this paper will first 
discuss the basis of power relations between competing groups that 
are based along ethnic and religious lines. While this may provide 
the first layer of understanding in unraveling Malaysia’s politics, 
there are also constructed alliances between ethnic communities 
and regions negotiated in 1948/1957 and 1963 respectively. However, 
they do not always take center stage in the analysis of competing 
ethnic demands. Nevertheless they remain the basis by which 
Malayan and later Malaysian nation-state was formed and therefore 
should also be understood. Then, this paper will explore the 
constructed axis of power between ethnic groups that gave birth to 
the social contract between Peninsular Malays and Chinese in 
particular, and the Malaysia Agreement that brought together four 
1) Public display of increasing ethnic divides can be seen in ethnic clashes in the 
urban settlement of Kampong (village/ settlement) Medan in 2001 that involved 
Indians and Malays. Since the 1969 ethnic riots, many potential ethnic clashes 
have been successfully averted through swift and firm action by authorities. But 
lately, this leadership appears to have waned and thus what previously would have 
been merely wars of words have come out to be open conflicts and confrontation. 
In 2015 alone, several clashes that are ethnic in character have been reported: the 
Taman Medan incidents in April 2015 revolving around a protest by 
Malays/Muslims against the public display of a cross in a church building; the 
ethnic clashes between Malays and Chinese in the Low Yat (shopping complex) 
in July 2015, and the Kota Raya (shopping complex) incident in December 2015. 
All later incidents are well documented/ reported and could be easily accessed on 
the web. All these have also happened in the Peninsular region and in the capital, 
Kuala Lumpur.
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formerly disparate regions into the larger Federation of Malaysia in 
19632). After which,  this paper will discuss how the nurturing of the 
1 Malaysia concept by Prime Minister Mohd. Najib might be 
promoted against the rise of ethnic separatism and the seeming 
sidelining of the basis of nation-state building that was laid down by 
the founding fathers of Malaya/Malaysia. The paper will conclude 
with the argument that “when the storm passes, calm returns” and 
that all these inter-ethnic and regional contestations will give way to 
long term peace and stability through the return of moderation that 
has characterized plural Malaya/Malaysia.
Ⅱ. Traditional Basis of Power
Politics is a numbers game. Malaysian politicians have proven that 
they understand this and are quite adept at using it to their political 
advantage. Strange as it may sound, it is in Malaysia that the 
majority needs to be protected and not the other way around. How 
did this come about? How did Malaysia justify this odd logic when 
in many countries, it is the minorities that needed protection from 
being overwhelmed by the majority?3)
Malaysia comprises the following main ethnic groups, namely 
Malay, Chinese, Indian and the aborigines (or the Orang Asli) in the 
Peninsular, and the Indigenous of Sabah and Sarawak (Table 1). In 
the latter two states, indigenous peoples number to about forty in 
each state but the more common ethnic classifications referred to or 
used in the two states are as follows: in Sabah, the Kadazan/Dusun, 
Bajau, Murut, Chinese, Malay and other bumiputera4) (to represent 
2) Federation of Malaya, British colonies of Sabah and Sarawak, and the Straits 
Settlement of Singapore.
3) In the United States, the increasing need of this could be seen in the promotion 
of the diversity policies that spell out how institutions would be required to 
promote and sustain diversities by ensuring that racial/ ethnic minorities are 
included in all phases of life in an organization. Diversity is a program that must 
be cascaded in institutions such as universities.
4) Literally, “bumi” is earth (land) and “putera” is prince; hence, prince (i.e. sons) 
of the soil; indigenous. The term “bumiputera” was obviously used to refer to the 
indigenous of Sabah and Sarawak in order that they enjoy the same privilege of 
the Malay with regards to the latter’s special position in the Malayan Constitution. 
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and classify much smaller ethnic groups), and in Sarawak, the 
Dayak or sometimes separately, the Iban, Bidayuh, and Orang Ulu,5) 
Malay/ Melanau and Chinese.
Table 1: Population & Parliament Seats
Ethnic / Regions
Population (2012)* Parliament (2008)**
‘000 % N %
Peninsular Malay 14,322 53 126 57
Peninsular Chinese 6,340 23 39 17
Peninsular Indian 1,925 9 0 0
Sarawak 2,214 7 31 14
Sabah 2,317 8 26 12
TOTAL 27,118 100 222 100
Sources: Rounded and adjusted from *(Malaysia 2013: 13 & 24) and **(Elections 
Commission, various reports) & local newspapers, 2008.
The 2012 Statistics Yearbook Malaysia reported that Malaysia’s 
population was 26.6 million (Malaysia 2013: 24). In the Peninsular 
region, the population break down may be seen in Table 1.
In the Peninsular area, Malays comprise the majority. They make 
up about 53% of the total citizenry, while the Chinese comprised 
about 23%, and the Indians, 9%. A very small percentage comprises 
the Orang Asli and many other smaller ethnic minorities such as the 
Baba/Nyonya, Portuguese, and Siamese communities. While the 
population composition of Malaysia may seem to be diverse, they 
are not all reflected in the federal legislative structure. Of 165 
parliamentary constituencies based in the Peninsula, 126 have been 
voted in by Malays as majority voters while the remaining 39 have 
been elected by the Chinese. The smaller ethnic minorities 
mentioned earlier do not present themselves as electorally important, 
except perhaps in the case of Indians in few constituencies where 
they may have become a deciding bloc in cases where a split have 
to be made between Malay and Chinese voters.
As bumiputera, the non-Malays of Sabah and Sarawak are extended the Malay’s 
“special position” first codified in the Constitution of Malay and later of Malaysia.
5) Literally, “interior people” or “upriver people” (i.e. ulu = upriver or interior; orang 
= people).
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Sarawak and Sabah national legislative numbers are 
comparable to the Peninsular Malay and Chinese blocs as the two 
states are seen as electoral blocs, though not always voting as a bloc 
(Table 1). Nevertheless, their political inclinations do not always 
follow the peninsular pattern and are thus sometimes considered as 
shaping factors in national politics. Furthermore, the diverse and 
radically plural character of Sarawak and Sabah set the two states 
part from 11 states in the Peninsula.6)
The demographic profile of Sarawak is presented in Table 2.  
From the population distribution, it may be seen as a truly plural 
state in that no one ethnic community dominates, as is the case in 
the Peninsula where Malays form absolute majority both in terms of 
their population as well as in the federal legislative structure, the 
parliament. In Sarawak, the largest ethnic group is the Iban, which 
forms about 32% of the state population.7) Together with the 
Bidayuh which forms about 9% and the Orang Ulu, which comprises 
7%, these three ethnic groups form the largest ethnic community of 
about 48%; collectively these ethnic are also known as the Dayak 
group.
The Malay/Melanau comprise 26% of the total population. The 
classification of these two ethnic groups as one is not founded on 
any strong basis other than the fact that half of the Melanau are 
Muslims and that prominent Muslim Melanau have risen to be 
important political figures in the early days of Sarawak and 
Malaysia’s formation.8) In fact, in colonial history, Melanau has also 
6) In the Peninsula, there are the nine Malay Sultanates plus the former straits 
settlements of Penang and Melaka. With the exception of Penang, all 10 are Malay 
majority states where Malay population outnumber Chinese and Indian 
populations combined. In some states such as Kelantan and Terengganu, Malays 
numbers may be as high as 90%. Penang on the other hand is the only state 
where the numbers of Malay and Chinese are about the same.
7) Percentage total of the state’s citizen population.
8) There are some who have argued that the Muslim Melanau aligned themselves to 
the Malay group to strengthen their claim to the state leadership where together 
they form 26% of the state population. With favorable federal Muslim leadership 
on their side, the Muslim Melanau stood a good chance to sustain their grip over 
the state. Melanau Muslim dominated the state leadership from 1970 to 2013, 
through the chief ministerships of Abdul Rahman Yacob (19790-1981) and Abdul 
Taib Mahmud (1981-2013).
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been classified within the Dayak group.9) The Chinese comprises 
about 26%.
Table 2: Sarawak: Population, Parliament & State Seats
Ethnic
Population 
2012
Parliament 
2015
State Seats 2011
2011 2015
‘000 % N % N % N %
Iban 713 32 10 32 21 30 24 29
Bidayuh 199 9 3 10 6 8 8 10
O/Ulu 156 7 3 10 4 6 6 7
Malay/Melanau 568 26 9 29 27 38 30 37
Chinese 578 26 6 19 13 18 14 17
TOTAL 2,214 100 31 100 71 100 82 100
Sources: Sarawak (2012); (Malaysia, Election Commission, various reports); & various 
issues of local newspapers between 2011 & 2015.
In the Malaysian parliament, Sarawak has 31 seats (14%). The 
distribution of these seats based on the composition of voters by 
ethnic background is shown in Table 2. The size of the 
parliamentary seats may not be indicating the dominant role that 
Sarawak plays in national politics. But clearly, the character of local 
politics at the state level will influence how these 31 state seats may 
be used to pursue the state’s interests in national level political 
processes. Numerically, it is clear that political contestation boils 
down to two large indigenous groups, namely the Dayak and the 
Muslim Malay/Melanau. The Dayak comprising the Iban, Bidayuh, 
and Orang Ulu have 31 seats out of the 71 seats in state assembly. 
In contrast, the Malay/Melanau has 27. But the Malay/Melanau10) is 
9) In Sarawak, the classifications of ethnic communities are rather fluid; outsiders 
could be easily confused as the following dichotomies have been used: (a) Iban*, 
Bidayuh*, Orang Ulu*, Malay /Melanau and Chinese; (b) Dayak*, Malay/Melanau 
and Chinese; (c) Muslim bumiputera, non-Muslim bumiputera, and Chinese; (d) 
bumiputera and non-bumiputera. See Jayum Jawan (1987).
10) The Muslim Melanau and the Malay are politically dominant because they have 
been unwavering in their unity, unlike the Dayak which only appears 
monolithically united like the Iban, Bidayuh, or Orang Ulu. Iban, the largest 
population in the state, is further divided into membership in various political 
parties. This reduces their claim to numerical dominance that remains merely 
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the largest single number for any ethnic group, surpassing even the 
Iban’s by six, although the latter’s population is much bigger than 
the former. In such a situation, the Chinese reaped the political 
advantage of being the “kingmaker” as it did in 1970 when political 
contestation for the state leadership boiled down to the Dayak 
versus Malay/Melanau; the Chinese support had determined the 
winner.11)
In Sabah, a more complex classification exists because the 
diverse groups are a lot smaller in number than those in Sarawak. 
For example, the largest indigenous groups are the Kadazan/Dusun, 
which has a population of about 25% of the state (Table 3). This is 
followed by the Bajau at about 19%, the Chinese at about 13%, and 
the Malay at about 8%. The seemingly large group is the “Other 
indigenous” or “other bumiputera”12) which is a summation of many 
smaller ethnic minorities comprising the largest at 28%. However, 
this is a statistically convenient lumping together into a category 
rather than as an ethnic group; although they may share some 
similarities in certain socio-cultural characteristics as category 
“Orang Ulu” for the many small ethnic groups of Sarawak.
In Sabah, the appearance of political dominance follows the 
classification used to further re-categorize the many ethnic groups. 
For example, it is common to see these ethnic groups in terms of 
the religious and ethnic divide, being non-Muslims, Muslim 
indigenous peoples, or bumiputera. In this way, the former 
comprises predominantly the Kadazan/Dusun ethnic groups while 
the latter comprises the Bajau, Murut and the “Other Bumiputera” 
that are predominantly Muslims.
perception as a powerhouse.
11) For examples, read Jayum Jawan (1991) and Michael B. Leigh (1974).
12) For example, this can comprise the Kedayan, Bisaya, Irranun, Rungus, Kimarang, 
Kwijau, Lundayeh, Ubian, Binadan, Orang Sungai, Tatana, Tagaas, Brunei, and 
Suluk. See Department of Information: website: www.penerangan.gov.my.
SUVANNABHUMI  Vol. 8 No. 2 (December 2016) 51-77.
58
Table 3: Sabah: Population
Ethnic
Population, 2012
‘000 %
Kadazan/Dusun 569 25
Malay 184 8
Bajau 450 19
Murut 102 4
Other Bumiputera 660 28
Chinese 296 13
Indian 7 0.3
Other 49 2
TOTAL 2,317 99.3
Source: Sabah (2012: Table 3.4).
Table 4 re-tabulates the various ethnic groups into three main 
categories as recently used in political analysis. Based on the profile 
of these indigenous ethnic group which placed them under either 
the categories of Muslim and non-Muslim, there are about 30 state 
constituencies that have majority Muslim voters.13)  This represents 
about a half of the total 60 seats in the state assembly. The second 
largest number with about 22 state seats has non-Muslim majority 
voters.14) In the remaining 8 constituencies, the Chinese form the 
majority of voters.15)
Table 4: Sabah: Legislative Seats
Ethnic
Parliament, 2015 State Assembly, 2013
N % N %
Bumiputera: Non-Muslim 7 27 22 37
Bumiputera: Muslim 17 65 30 50
Chinese 2 8 8 13
TOTAL 26 100 60 100
Sources: Adapted from various reports from the Election Commission and statistics 
as reported by local newspapers during strategic elections periods.
Note: *Bumiputera, non-Muslim (or Kadazan/Dusun). Bumiputera, Muslim: Malay, 
Bajau and Murut, and other bumiputera.
13) In two state seats (Gum-Gum and Tanjong Kapor), Muslim voters are about 50%, 
making them the largest group, compared to the other two, namely the 
non-Muslim and the Chinese voters.
14) In one state constituency, Inanam, non-Muslim voters form the largest percentage 
compared to  Muslim and Chinese voters.
15) In two state constituencies, Chinese voters comprised of the largest but do not 
constitute the majority.
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When the Muslim-Non-Muslim divide is used, the Muslim 
group appears to dominate based on the fact that there are about 
17 parliament seats (65%) in Sabah in which they form the majority 
of the voters. Similarly, they would also be the majority voice in the 
state assembly with about 30 seats and also claim majority Muslim 
voters.  Nevertheless, the second claim is not as strong as the 50% 
plus 1 numerical requirement is not reached. However, because the 
other 30 seats are further divided between the Non-Muslim (22) and 
Chinese (8), this claim of 30 state seats is strengthened as it only 
takes one of the other community’s support to land power in the 
hand of the Muslim group.
It has been clearly shown through statistical data that Sabah 
and Sarawak are plural states. No one ethnic group can lay claim 
to absolute majority—not even in Sabah where Muslim might use 
the religious label to lay claim to being the dominant group. This 
conjecture, even if made, is not sustainable because  the majority is 
based on a loose merger of many small ethnic groups.
The analysis above contrasts sharply with the Peninsula where 
Malay may lay a valid claim to dominance in all but one state, 
Penang. In Penang, both in terms of population and legislature, 
Malay and Chinese number almost equally.16) In some states such 
as Kelantan, Terengganu, and Perlis, Malay dominance becomes 
more pronounced where Malay population rose to as high as 95%. 
In states such as Kelantan, Terengganu, and Perlis, all parliamentary 
and states seats have overwhelming Malay majorities. For example, 
a Muslim Chinese won Kota Lama state constituency in Kelantan 
because he had ridden on PAS’s and Malay votes, and not because 
there were enough Chinese votes to carry him through.17)
16) Penang is also a state in which the leadership of the government has always been 
allocated by the ruling National Front (NF) to its Chinese partner, Gerakan (Parti 
Gerakan Rakyat). Gerakan is a component of the national ruling coalition, the NF, 
which is led by the United Malays National Organization [UMNO]). This was the 
case since the 1960’s until the coalition lost the state in the 2008 general elections 
to a Chinese-led DAP (Democratic Action Party), the opponent of MCA 
(Malaysian Chinese Association)/Gerakan in NF.
17) Anuar Tan Abdullah is the only non-Malay (Muslim Chinese) who won in 
Kelantan and a member of the state executive council. See www.kelantan.gov.my.
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In any final analysis, the quantity of participation must at 
some point be judged against the quality of participation as well.  
Mere presence gives appearance of participation but do not 
necessarily guarantee quality involvement and real sharing in 
governance.
Ⅲ. Axis of Power
Any attempt to explain political contestations in Malaysia is 
incomplete without understanding how two important socio-political 
developments shaped the nation-state. They remain important 
documents as the foundation of modern Malaysia. These are, first, 
the “Social Contract” drawn in 1948 among various parties but 
specifically shaped to enhance relations between Malays and 
non-Malays, i.e. Chinese and Indians;18) second, the Malaysia 
Agreement that brought together the Federation of Malaya, 
Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak in 1963 (Hanna 1964). Singapore left 
the Federation in 1965.
Both documents are sparingly referred to in contestation and 
this is not enough because the totality of the matters and 
agreements in both documents must be seen together and in their 
entirety. One portion or aspect cannot be argued independently of 
the others, as Malaya, and later on, Malaysia, was formed from all 
agreements contained therein.
3.1. The Social Contract
The Social Contract is premised on the need to ensure that Malay 
polity and political dominance remain in Malay hands in 
post-British Malay states. This developed after the end of the Second 
War World when the British devised a plan for the transition of 
power to locals. In return for that assurance, there were concessions 
to the Chinese and Indians. The latter comprised those who had 
initially migrated as laborers who had since either become naturalized, 
18) The history of the emergence of this contract can be read from Mohamed 
Noordin Sopiee (1974).
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and who had been born of either naturalized parents or migrant 
workers.
When the British proposed the Malayan Union plan in 1946, 
citizenship for the new nation-state was very liberal to the extent 
that the Malayan Union would have a population proportion  which 
is half Malay and half Chinese and Indian. The Malay saw this as 
a threat, as it resulted in their losing political authority/power in the 
homeland “Tanah Melayu”.19) The Malay response was to organize 
opposition to the British idea. They were able to convince their 
Sultans to take their side, as well as some prominent British 
Colonial officers sympathetic to their claim. As a result, negotiation 
led to what was then termed as a contract that contained terms 
acceptable to many stakeholders, chiefly the Malays, Chinese, 
Indians, the Malay Sultans, and the British government (Noordin 
Sopiee 1974).
In place of the Union, the Federation of Malaya was formed 
in 1948. The agreement to the new form of the nation-state was also 
accompanied by several terms agreed upon by various stakeholders. 
First, citizenship was made more stringent with terms such as: (1) 
continuous, uninterrupted residency to specific years before applying 
for citizenship; (2) the pledge of allegiance to the Malay rulers; (3) 
ability to speak the Malay language. This new term of citizenship 
substantially reduced Chinese and Indian citizenship population to 
less than 40% then, and thereby restored Malay political superiority 
or dominance.20)
Second, Malay was to be the official/ national language of the 
Federation while other languages may also be spoken and 
19) Tanah Melayu is also the term used to refer to Malaya and which means “Malay 
land”. With two ethnic populations that are almost equal in number, there is no 
majority and neither group can claim superiority or dominance. The majority 
would be fluid and based on a shifting balance that may oscillate among the 
Malay, Chinese, and Indian.
20) Contestation in Malaysia and between Peninsular Malays and Chinese centers on 
the term political dominance that is translated into Malay as “ketuanan”, 
meaning dominance but further suggests a relations between a Master (tuan) and 
his slaves/servants. Thus the resentment when the term is used as it  suggests 
that Malays are Masters and Chinese slaves/servants.
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promoted. The latter specifically referred to Mandarin and Tamil. 
Both Mandarin and Tamil are languages of instructions in Chinese 
and Indian schools and these have raised many issues related to 
nation-state building. Since then, schools have three languages of 
instructions, namely Malay, Mandarin and Tamil.21) Third, the 
special position of the Malay is to be recognized while at the same 
time the legitimate interests of other communities are to be 
protected. This special position is clearly spelled out in terms of 
provisions for Malay like the number or proportion of scholarship, 
business licenses, and membership in the civil service, land/land 
reserve. Fourth, the position of the Malay rulers in the Federation 
is also an integral part of this social contract. Fifth, Islam is to be 
the religion of the Federation and that other religions may also be 
practiced in peace.
The above terms were written into the Constitution of the 
Federation of Malaya 1948. They were carried over into the new 
constitution of the Federation of Malaya that gained independence 
in 1957. Thus, the Constitution of Malaya 1948/1957 had restored 
Malay political supremacy and defined how relations are to be 
constructed thereafter between the Malays, Chinese, and Indians in 
the new nation-state. 
3.2. Malaysia Agreement
The Malaysia Agreement is another important document. It defined 
many important roles for players within the enlarged federal 
nation-state called the Federation of Malaysia. It assigned power and 
gave exceptions as well as exclusions to states.22) As a consequence, 
Malaysia is not the normal federal nation-state explained by the 
theory of federalism but an imperfect one.23) The Federation of 
21) Discourses on nation-state building have focused on the problem of having three 
streams of education, namely the Malay (as national stream), the Mandarin, and 
the Tamil. Before Malaya’s independence, this posed a serious problem as 
curriculum was made following the needs of the three streams. The Chinese and 
Indian argument in post-Malaya is that the Malay (national) school has a thrust 
in Malay and Islam and therefore it is not nationally-driven. 
22) The process of the formation of the Federation of Malaysia is well-documented 
and explained by Willard A. Hanna (1964).
23) For a general review and refresher of what federalism and the federal state are, 
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Malaysia came into being through the coming together of four 
regions, namely the independent Federation of Malaya, the Straits 
Settlement of Singapore, and the British Colonies of Sabah and 
Sarawak. All states in the federation were given the same list of 
power enumerated in the State List,24) but in addition to that extra 
items were assigned only to the states of Sabah and Sarawak; some 
of these are enumerated under “Additional Protection for States of 
Sabah and Sarawak”.25)
Hanna (1964) and Noordin Sopiee (1974) have provided 
detailed accounts of this political processes and explained many 
provisions that were built into Malaysia. First, there is the need to 
understand what Sabah claimed to be a “20-Point” demand that the 
state put forward as conditions for it to join the Federation. There 
is also a similar demand from Sarawak for about 18 items. Some of 
the salient features of the Malaysia Agreements that may from time 
to time inflame relations between the federal and state governments 
are as follows:
1)  Religion (Article 3, Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia):
Borneo states were plural, comprising many ethnic communities 
with different ways of life and faith. In Sabah, Malays who are 
generally Muslim form a small percentage of the total population. It 
probably comprised of no more than 5% of the total population 
then, although in terms of the number of Muslims, the percentage 
would probably jump to about 40%.26) In Sarawak, Malays and 
Muslims are about 21%, then and now  (Table 2). Thus, it was not 
surprising that both states requested not be subjected to having 
Islam as religion. However, it was reported that both states do not 
object to Islam being the religion of the federation, and that it 
should apply only to states in the Peninsula. The Borneo concern 
and objection was therefore recorded.
This issue has of late yielded discussions. There is the issue on 
see Wheare (1966).
24) Ninth Schedule, Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia, 2010.
25) Article 161, Part XII A, Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia, 2010.
26) For example, the Kadazan/Dusun are generally Christian and pagan, while the 
Bajau, Murut and other smaller ethnic minorities are mostly Muslims. See Table 3.
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the use of the term “Allah” that Muslims claim are exclusive to 
them, including a host of other Arabic terms that Christians may not 
use. Conflicts over the importation of Bibles in Indonesian language 
has fanned schism between Christians and Muslims and so too the 
public display of crosses or cross-like images that some Muslims 
take offense.27)
2) Language (Article 152, Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia):
Both Borneo states agreed that Malay will be the official 
language and that the use of English should also be allowed. This 
was recorded in the constitution and both states were given 10 years 
to consider whether they would wish to continue to use English or 
adopt the Malay as the official language. As it turned out in 1974, 
the Federal Minister of Education, Abdul Rahman Yacob, who was 
from Sarawak, campaigned for the acceptance of Malay as the 
official language. Malay was therefore adopted as the official 
language in the whole of Malaysia beginning in 1974.
3) Immigration:
The power and rights to grant entry into the states of Sabah 
and Sarawak were placed in both states. The initial idea for 
requesting this provision was to ensure Sabah and Sarawak had time 
to “catch up” with the state of economic development of the more 
advanced states. This power meant to prevent the exploitation of 
Sabah and Sarawak by peoples from the economically advanced 
states in the Federation, including Singapore.
Thus, while there is free movement of people within and 
27) See for examples, Niluksi Koswanage. 2014. “Malaysia’s Islamic Authority Seize 
Bibles as Allah row deepens”, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-religion
- idUSBREA010C120140102. (Accessed December 29, 2015); “Taman Medan Rep 
says cross sign protest politically motivated, http://english.astroawani. 
com/malaysia-news/taman-medan-rep-says-cross-sign-protest-politically-motivate
d-58239. (Accessed December 29, 2015); Sophie Brown. 2014. “Malaysian Court 
to Christians: You can’t say ‘Allah’”, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2014/06/24/world/-asia/malaysia-allah-ban/. (Accessed December 29, 2015); 
“http:/ /www.reu ters.com/ article/us-ma laysia-rel igion-idUSBREA010C 
120140102cross-shaped air well”, http://www.thestar.com.my/-news/nation/2015/ 
12/29/developer-begins-repainting-crossshaped-air-wells/. (Accessed December 
29, 2015).
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between all states in the federation, peoples from outside Sabah and 
Sarawak may be prevented from entering either states by authorities. 
Both states are not required to furnish reason to deny them entry.28) 
The court has in the past upheld Sabah and Sarawak’s power under 
this provision to deny people from other states to enter Sabah or 
Sarawak.29)
4) Borneonization:
The state civil services were to be filled by locals, and while 
locals were being trained to take over these positions, British officers 
were to be retained for the time being. But this was not quite 
acceptable to the federal leadership. Federal officers from the 
Peninsula were used to fill positions left vacant by British officers 
while waiting for locals to be trained and therefore take over these 
positions. This issue remains contentious to this day for the state 
and federal governments. States have complained that there are too 
many federal officers taking up positions that could have been given 
to locals. Compounding this is the accusations that have surfaced 
that federal officers have come to do more than what was intended. 
Some federal officers from the Peninsular region have been accused 
of transgressing on local customs and tradition and cause ill feelings 
among the multiethnic society of Sarawak by preaching their narrow 
approach to politics and society ingrained by their parochial 
Peninsular experience.30)
5) Special Position of Indigenous Races:
The article on the Special position of the Malays was amended 
28) See for the latest ban, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/-asiapacific/nurul- 
izzah-banned-from/2324150.html, accessed December 29, 2015; http://www.theantdaily. 
com/Main/Sabah-and-Sarawak-s-right-to-say-Sorry-no-entry (Accessed December 
29, 2015).
29) “Court denies Ambiga leave to appeal Sarawak ban”, http://www.themalaysianinsider. 
com/malaysia/article/court-denies-ambiga-leave-to-appeal-sarawak-ban. (Accessed 
February 1, 2016) & “Ambiga fails in challenge against ban on entering Sabah”, 
https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/313784. (Accessed February 2, 2016). 
30) Doubtful conversions have made rounds in may local papers and social media, 
where rural inhabitants are supposedly “tricked.” Converting out is made tedious 
by bureaucratic procedures. For cases, see Sibon & Ling (2014) and Fernandex 
(2014).
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and extended to the indigenous of Sabah and Sarawak.31) For the 
purpose of enjoying this privilege, indigenous peoples in both states 
are defined as follows: in Sarawak, they comprise the Iban, Bidayuh, 
Orang Ulu, Malay, and Melanau32); in Sabah, “… a person indigenous 
to Sabah”.33) Again, this controversial, as both states have in the 
past made claims that they do not feel part of the federation as the 
special provision has not been effective in giving them access to 
many areas promised therein.
The above documents discussed in brief are important in the 
political and economic contestations in the country. They should be 
the total basis of discourses and not just selected provisions that fit 
narrow arguments that skew the whole picture. Until discourses are 
made more impartial and willing to look at contestations from the 
holistic perspective, a new consensus on how to move forward may 
not be immediately tenable.
Singapore left the Federation in 1965 after many spats 
concerning how relations between Malays and non-Malays should 
be shaped. Singapore was not able to accept the fact that the “new” 
Malaysia entity is a Malay-dominated nation-state and that Chinese 
should play second fiddle to the former. This meant that it has no 
particular liking for the social contract that were devised earlier by 
Malaya and were to govern relations between Malays and non-Malays. 
Towards this end, Singapore, a state which has a Chinese majority, 
was more assertive about equality and promoted a Malaysian 
Malaysia approach compared to the more tamed Malayan Chinese. 
The clash was inevitable and before the “fire” spread to others, 
Singapore was out of the federation.
31) Article 153, Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia, 2010. Before 1963, this was 
meant for Malays of then Malaya.
32) A complete list may be viewed in Article 161A (7), Constitution of the Federation 
of Malaysia, 2010.
33) See Article 161A (6), Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia, 2010; it was more 
open and not listed in detail.
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Ⅳ. Nation-State Building
Whatever the process of nation-state building is called, its ultimate 
aim is to create a nation-state where citizens subscribe to its shared 
symbols and constructed national identity. The big question is: does 
Malaysians have these? And what are they?
Malaya and Malaysia have gone through various processes in 
building the nation-state as the former sought to construct shared 
values, symbols, and identity. The processes have at different time 
periods were called by different names such as “bangsa Malaysia” 
and “1 Malaysia”.34) What all the processes have in common is that 
they have promoted diversities, although their inherent aim was to 
mold a common  Malaysian culture which would give the country 
a definitive identity.
A brief review of history will show that the processes were 
pursued in contradiction from the start. The Malayan “social contract” 
and the Malaysia Agreement allowed and promoted diversities, and 
that the molding of the Malaysian national identity was to be based 
on the state’s diverse peoples, cultures, and ways of life. Many of 
these processing guidelines for building of the nation-state were 
coded in national policies entrenched in diversity and contradictions.35) 
Discussion on some of these may illustrate the above points.
The national education policies launched before Malaya 
attained independence in 1957 promoted diversity and sustained 
four educational systems, namely the Islamic, Malay, Mandarin, and 
Tamil.36) The policies distinguished conscious (mind) development 
into four compartments, namely, Islamic Malaysians, Malay 
Malaysian (national), Chinese Malaysians, and Indian Malaysians; 
later, the content of Malay (national), Mandarin, and Tamil 
34) For some discussions, see for example, Shamsul AB. (1996).
35) These policies are as follows: the language provision of the social contract that 
stipulates Malay as the official language while other languages are allowed to 
prosper without hindrance; the national cultural policy that lists all major 
components of national culture despite the fact that not all populations readily 
embrace them as “national.” It may be inferred that Malaysia cultures must be 
a composition of all existing ethnic cultures.
36) Briefs of these policies may be read from Jayum A. Jawan (2003).
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education shared “Malayan/ Malaysian” content. Division based on 
the four systems persisted and further compounded by the fact that 
non-Malays (i.e. Chinese and Indian) are not part of the national 
education structure that constructs the education policy for the 
country especially after Malaya/ Malaysia.37)
It does not help that religious polemic permeates the national 
school system where non-Malay, non-Muslim parents are concerned 
about their children being subjected to religious proselytization by 
overzealous teachers. This has not only encouraged the 
sustainability of national-type schools (e.g. Mandarin and Tamil) but 
also gave rise to the mushrooming and popularity of international 
schools that subscribe to international curricula, either British or 
American. Thereby the process of nation-state building is further 
eroded with the new school of thought molding Malaysians in 
another “direction”.38)
Until many important elements in the Malaysian multi-ethnic 
society are brought together to devise a “Malaysia” policy on 
education, education policies and blueprints are not going to get the 
support of the multi-ethnic society. It will continue to be viewed as 
a one-sided policy promoting the interest of only one community. 
The National Cultural Policy launched in 1971 is another 
policy that had a good motive but failed to generate the desired 
37) In the Malaysian education system, non-Malays do not get appointed in the 
hierarchy; they also do not get strategic positions in the Ministry of Higher 
Education and the Ministry of Education Malaysia, the highest education 
policy-making and implementing institutions. For example, out of 30 directorship 
positions in the Ministry of Education, only one is held by an Indian who heads 
the Sports Division. The rest is held by Malays; the two deputies ministers are 
P. Kalamanathan, an Indian, and Chong Sin Woon, a Chinese; see 
www.moe.gov.my, accessed December 29, 2015. The same situation also exists in 
the Ministry of Higher Education, where directorships are given to Malays; the 
ministry’s only deputy minister post is held by a Chinese, Mary Yap of Sabah, 
www.mohe.gov.my. (Accessed December 29, 2015).
38) Malaysians are cautious of speaking on this issue as one can be hauled up under 
laws governing discussing “sensitive” issues. Hopefully, the subject can be 
deliberated more openly following Johor’s Sultan comment, see “Johor Sultan 
slams Malaysia’s multi-stream schools”, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/ 
johor-sultan-slams-malaysias-multi-stream-schools. (Accessed December 29, 
2015).
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outcome and that was to mold Malaysia’s national cultural identity. 
According to the policy, the molding of Malaysia culture is to be 
based on Malay culture and Islamic values, as well as cultural 
elements from Malaysia’s diverse ethnic communities, as long as the 
latter’s values do not conflict with Islam.39) On policy, this sounds 
very good. But when it comes to the identification of what cultural 
elements from all communities are to be “adopted” as Malaysia’s 
cultural identity, these elements are easily identifiable but are not 
readily adoptable by all. Thus, after all efforts are made, the process 
just returns to where it all began, with each community tending to 
its own cultural enclave. There is therefore no agreement on what 
constitutes national symbols, values, and identity.  What are the 
values and cultural manifestation that constitute and identify 
Malaysia and therefore distinguish it from another nationality?
At best, the identification of these “shared” values and cultural 
artifacts centers on secondary indicators of nationalistic symbols, 
values, and cultural manifestation, such as cuisine like nasi lemak 
(rice cooked in coconut milk), roti canai (Indian pancakes), teh tarik 
(pulled tea). The effort had not gone beyond gathering all cultural 
artifacts and values that cut across ethnic groups to be accepted by 
all. Thus, for example, when a minister attends an official function, 
the Malay minster is welcomed by a kompang beating group, a 
Chinese minister by a lion dance, an Indian minister by a huge 
flower garland, and a Dayak minister by a dayak war dance 
accompanied by either gong playing or a sape music. These are not 
examples of shared culture values that have been developed, 
although all cultural elements of all ethnic groups have been 
preserved but are not embraced by all within the context of building 
a “shared” national culture.40) At best, when a prime minister 
attends official functions, he has on occasions been welcomed by a 
combination of the said parties.
In the final analysis, what belongs to each ethnic group are 
39) To appease all communities, specifically mentioned are the cultural values and 
civilization of the Chinese and Indian as well as the cultural and ways of lives 
of the indigenous peoples of Sarawak and Sabah.
40) A classic discourse on this issue may be read from  Gabriel Almond & Sidney 
Verba’s (1963; 1989).
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held dearly by that particular ethnic group, but not similarly held by 
others. This low level of acceptance may also extend to national 
symbols that are considered “national” symbols, cultures, and values 
because they have not been developed and derived together in a 
consensual manner.
The failure to generate this feeling of “sharing” of nationals 
symbols, values, and artifacts are due to the failure to involve all 
groups in the process of nation-state building. National institutions 
are still heavily dominated by one or another ethnic group to the 
exclusion of many others.41) This exclusive policy does not 
contribute to the inclusiveness the government has been promoting 
in seeking to mold “shared” values and vision in education towards 
creating a “bangsa” Malaysia that Mahathir envisioned or the “1 
Malaysia” that Najib Razak is attempting to promote. It is also 
probably why the education policy and its implementation are 
increasingly becoming more controversial as both ministries do not 
have the benefit of wisdom from other communities in the 
formulation processes. Far from moving the nation-state towards 
realizing “shared” values as in the rise of a “bangsa” Malaysia or “1 
Malaysia”, education has divided ethnic communities due to many 
issues that cannot be resolved unilaterally.
It has been easy to address political representation as NF has 
done when Sabah and Sarawak were accordingly rewarded after 
helping the coalition win in the general elections of 2008 and 2013. 
Never before had Sabah and Sarawak been given 6 seats each in the 
federal cabinet as both states were given especially after the 2013 
general elections.42) More transparency could have also followed this 
41) See and check all the departments, divisions or units of the ministry, 
www.moe.gov.my. (Accessed December 29, 2015). 
42) The six federal ministers from Sarawak did not include Idris Jala, who was 
brought into the government to spearhead economic reforms after his successful 
stint in turning the financially losing Malaysia Airlines into profitability. He was 
drafted into Malaysia Airlines in 2005 by Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi and 
drafted into the federal cabinet by Mohd. Najib in 2009, the same year the latter 
took over the premiership from Abdullah. See http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/ 
leading_in_the_21st_century/turning_around_a_struggling_airline_an_interview_wit
h_the_ceo_of_malaysia_airlines, http://www.economistinsights.com/speaker/4189, 
both (Accessed December 31, 2015).
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political sharing of cabinet posts and the same formula could have 
been adopted by UMNO instead of dominating the senate with its 
members and allies that have not helped it in the last general 
elections.43)
Ⅴ. The Role of Sabah/ Sarawak
Ethnic contestation is on the rise. In the 1970’s, the reason for this 
was blamed on socio-economic and political imbalances between 
the Malays and Chinese.44) To address this imbalance, the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) was launched in 1971. More than forty years 
later, this contestation is even much more intense and has resulted 
in the emergence of many more dimensions to the ethnic conflicts 
and competitions. Today, it is now no longer merely about the 
economic and political imbalances between Malays and Chinese; the 
divide is shaped by various factors such as education, language, 
religion, economic, and region. Although the “social contract” or the 
Malaysia Agreement were supposed to resolve many of these issues 
considered sensitive then, they have failed to bring together the 
Malay and Chinese as well as the indigenous of Sabah and Sarawak.  
The old premise that any resolution must be based on an  everyone 
wins scenario appears to have given way to victory of just one side. 
Accommodation, tolerance, cooperation, and the attitude of 
give-and-take are now seen as a display of weaknesses. Politicization 
of these issues by politicians who ride on them to generate popular 
appeal does not help either.
43) For example, out of the 41 members nominated by the ruling party, 22 are from 
UMNO, 6 MIC, 6 MCA and two others held those associated with the Malayan 
parties. Sarawak and Sabah were given only 2 each despite their significant 
contribution to winning the parliamentary majority compared to the decimated 
MCA and MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) that clearly did not “politically” 
deserve the number of their senatorial seats based on electoral performance in 
2013. For the numbers of nominated members of the senate and their affiliations, 
see www.parlimen.gov.my. (Accessed December 29, 2015).
44) The issue might be reduced to: the few held too much economic wealth at the 
expense of the many. Furthermore, the many were then deemed “migrant” in 
contrast to the locals who were seen as economically displaced in their own 
home.
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The above scenario develops against the backdrop of a failing 
Malay unity in UMNO45) that has been seen as the standard bearer 
for the Malays. The old premise is that UMNO is Malay and Malay 
is UMNO, and therefore when UMNO lost substantial political 
support to Islamic/ Malay PAS46) and the new Malay-led PKR47) in 
two previous general elections, the balance of power was deemed to 
have tilted against the Malays.48) The heightened conflicts between 
ethnic groups are not at all helping when there is public perception 
that the institutions of government are seen to be taking sides.49) 
For example, the Malay dominated police force has been seen to be 
45) UMNO: “United Malays National Organization” has always won majority Malay 
support in the Peninsula, and when UMNO, with the help of its partners such 
as MCA [Malaysian Chinese Association], did not get enough seats to pass the 
majority threshold to form the federal government in 2008 and 2013, Malays 
deemed power had slip from their hands once again. This may have prompted 
a more “nationalistic” approach to politics that put non-Malays into a state of 
“worry”.
46) PAS: Pan Islamic Party is basically a Malay party and the main UMNO opponent 
for Malay support. It has won and is the ruling party in the Malay state of 
Kelantan, which has more than 95% Malay population.
47) PKR: Anwar Ibrahim formed Parti Keadilan Rakyat in the 1990’s after the former 
was removed as Deputy Prime Minister and as UMNO member. In the 2008 
general elections, PKR won Selangor state when it partnered with 
Chinese-dominated DAP (Democratic Action Party) and Malay/Muslim PAS. DAP 
won the Penang state government in 2008 and retained the same in 2013, as did 
PKR in Selangor as well.
48) But the total Malay seats continued to be held by Malays who are members of 
the three political parties. 
49) Recent indications and incidents that undermine public perception of political 
and government institutions are the following: the neutrality of the police force 
(for example, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/igp-denies-bias-sedition-arrests-says-act- 
bn-074800320.html; “Police bias betrays public trust”, https://www.malaysiakini. 
com/letters/8134; the appearance that there is no legal/constitutional recourse for 
non-Muslims when their interests collide with Muslims, especially regarding 
conversion and religious issues;. For examples, see “Appeals Court: Not for us to 
hear Muslim conversion cases”, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/ 
2015/12/31/appeals-court-not-for-us-to-hear-muslim-conversion-cases/. (Accessed 
December 31, 2015). For instance, Mohamed Hanipa Maidin asked: “Can 
non-Muslims get justice from a Muslim court” after civil court says its not within 
their jurisdiction to hear cases about conversion”, http://www.freemalaysiatoday. 
com/category/opinion/2015/12/31/can-non-muslims-get-justice-from-a-muslim-co
urt/. (Accessed December 31, 2015); and appearance of tilted actions of national 
leaders that portray taking sides, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/ 
article/at-low-yat-2-opening-ismail-sabri-calls-on-minorities-to-support-all-malay.
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slow in taking action against Malays accused of making offending 
remarks against the beliefs of Christians; it is also perceived as often 
quick to act against non-Malays when Malays complained that Islam 
is subverted. This negative perception of government extended to 
Malay cabinet ministers who have been seen in the same light 
especially in the confiscation and importation of Bibles written in 
the Malay (Indonesia) language. It is against this backdrop that PAS 
and PKR rode to moral electoral victory and took substantial portion 
of Malay support in the 2008 and 2013 general elections, and 
winning a number of important states such as Selangor and keeping 
Kelantan, as well as yielding Penang, and for a short while Perak in 
2008 through their partner, the DAP. Before these general elections, 
UMNO enjoyed overwhelming support from the Malays. With the 
solid support from the Peninsular Chinese, the Alternative Front (BA 
[Barisan Alternatif])50) was almost swept to power at the federal 
level. With the party’s strong wins in 2008 and 2013, it had denied 
the ruling National Front (NF) the usual two-thirds majority the 
latter had taken for granted before 2008. Since the 1960’s, the NF 
has won the general parliamentary elections with a two-thirds 
majority and kept intact all states, except one or two states, such as 
Kelantan, Terengganu, or Sabah.
Sabah and Sarawak may be the last chance to improve 
inter-ethnic relations that have been reneged from in the Peninsular 
region because of the Malay-Chinese contestation. Both states 
cannot be swayed by ethnic bigotry emanating from the Peninsular, 
as the experiences of Sabah and Sarawak are different. Both states 
are plural with many small ethnic communities. Life in these two 
states has been about cooperating and accommodating each other 
unlike in the Peninsular region where Malays are dominant and 
therefore do not feel need to accommodate Chinese and Indians. 
But the Malay accommodation of  the Chinese and Indians in the 
early 1940’s and 1950’s speaks volumes of the generosity, leadership, 
and wisdom of past leaders, and this must be remembered by the 
successors.
Towards thwarting declining inter-ethnic relations, Sabah and 
50) Opposition alliance of PKR, DAP and PAS.
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Sarawak need to put their foot down. They have to leverage their 58 
parliamentary seats to put up a strong message to their coalition 
partners and the leader, UMNO. It must advocate the need to bring 
sense to the deteriorating state of affairs in relation to ethnic and 
religious ties, governance, and managing increasing openness, and 
bureaucratic paralysis currently gripping the country, its leaders and 
institutions. Sabah and Sarawak have a strong mandate that  may 
be used to get the necessary leverage from the federal leadership, as 
the sustainability of the ruling NF government is dependent upon 
them. Without the number of seats won from Sabah and Sarawak by 
NF component, the NF would not have enough parliamentary 
majority to claim the right to form the federal government after the 
2013 general elections. Although they have been generously 
rewarded with increased posts in the federal cabinet, Sabah and 
Sarawak have a moral obligation and duty to ensure a more stable 
and peaceful Malaysia. Because Sabah and Sarawak are non-Malay 
majority states, they can leverage on their combined parliamentary 
numbers to moderate the Malay majority from the Peninsular 
region. In recent years, Sabah and Sarawak regional sentiment is 
growing stronger. In Sarawak, this sentiment was strongly shown in 
support of the new Chief Minister, Adenan Satem, who secured a 
two-third majority in the Sarawak Assembly. He was given the 
strong mandate due to his campaigning on the state’s right that he 
promised to bring up in national politics.51)
Ⅵ. Conclusion
The founding fathers showed that Malaysia was formed from a 
consensus built through negotiation, co-operation, compromise, 
give-and-take, and above all, justice and fair play. In this they had 
shown statesmanship. Malaya was granted independence from 
Britain in 1957 because Malay, Chinese, and Indian leaders came 
together to forge an alliance that convinced the British that they 
could work together. And later, Malaysia was formed through many 
51) Adenan Satem took over as Chief Mnister of Sarawak in 2014 from the longest 
reigning chief minister, Abdul Taib Mahmud (1981-2014). The May 2016 was a 
state election in which he received his own mandate to rule.
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negotiations, compromises, and assurances that the new nation-state 
would benefit all parties. To assure concerns expressed by some 
parties, many special provisions were built into the federal constitution.
Contemporary Malaysian leaders need to go back and re-visit 
these values that had made it possible for the birth and independence 
of Malaya and the formation of Malaysia. The nation-state needs to 
continue to promote these values and its leaders must realize that 
this is the only way forward. The population and legislative 
majorities are not licence to bulldoze and cow minorities to accept 
what are determined by majority without consultation from the 
minorities. The lop-sided public bureaucracy needs to be improved 
and the balance that may be required in the private sector to offset 
the change to the former must also be considered. This approach 
has been used before to address socio-economic imbalance found in 
the early 1970’s and the same approach could still be adopted 
successfully to reform the same structure that heavily favors a few 
ethic communities over many others.
Above all there is a need to review and strengthen the Malaysia 
Agreement in order to fix gaps that appeared since Malaysia was 
formed in 1963. Provisions of the Malaysia Agreement cannot be 
viewed in isolation. They must be seen and reviewed collectively as 
each provision are part of the total agreement. The issues are still 
very much the same although the dimensions have been enlarged 
and have yielded new perspectives. Leaders from the major and 
various majority groups must show the lead and wisdom to 
collectively overcome excessive demands of each ethnic community 
and rise above these parochialisms to restore peace and order in 
order. Everyone must strive to move forward as one state with many 
nations.
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